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Abstract
This paper develops extensive new indices of legal independence (central bank independence
(CBI)) for new central banks (CBs) in 26 former socialist economies. The indices reveal
that CB reform in the FSE during the 1990s has been quite ambitious. In spite of large price
shocks, reformers in those countries chose to create CBs with levels of legal independence
that are substantially higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the 1980s.
The evidence in the paper shows that CBI is unrelated to inﬂation during the early stages of
liberalization. But for sufﬁciently high and sustained levels of liberalization, and controlling
for other variables, legal CBI and inﬂation are signiﬁcantly and negatively related. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the view that even high CBI cannot contain the initial powerful
inﬂationary impact of price decontrols. But once the process of liberalization has gathered
sufﬁcient momentum legal independence becomes effective in reducing inﬂation. The paper
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also presents evidence on factors that affect the choice of CBI and examines the relation
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1. Introduction
The, still ongoing, process of transition from plan to market in the former
socialist economies (FSE) involves a fundamental process of change in the structure
of those economies. In their attempt to create the institutional infrastructure
needed for a market economy governments of the FSE scrapped old institutions
and replaced them with new ones that were often patterned after similar institutions
in the Western democracies. One element of this process was the creation of a
Western type central bank (CB). Practically, all FSE either created a totally new
CB by breaking the, typically socialist, Monobank into a CB and a private banking
system or, in the case of several Central and East European (CEE) countries,
substantially upgraded the legal independence of their preexisting CBs. Within a
span of 8 years (1991–1998) all FSE created completely new CB laws, or reformed
existing laws, at least once and sometimes even twice. Although there are sub-
stantial cross country variations among these new CB laws practically all of them
embody substantially higher levels of independence than was the case in the pre-
reform period.
Prior to, and in some cases after, the enactment of the CB law most transition
economies experienced high and variable inﬂation. In some cases those inﬂationary
episodes even assumed hyperinﬂationary dimensions.1 The conjunction of high
inﬂation and of CB reform provides a unique opportunity to examine the
relationship between inﬂation and central bank independence (CBI) in environments
with major structural changes and high inﬂation.
This paper has two major purposes. The ﬁrst is to document and quantify the
cross sectional and over time variation in the level of legal CBI in transition
economies in a manner that allows systematic comparisons with the independence of
CBs in more mature market economies. The second is to examine whether higher
legal CBI is associated with lower inﬂation as is the case in developed economies.2
This negative association between inﬂation and legal independence is not obvious a
priori for several reasons. First, as is the case in non-FSE developing countries, legal
independence may be a poor proxy for actual independence because of substantial
1An informative overall summary of the evolution of inﬂation in FSE appears in Stern (1996).
2Early evidence on inﬂation and CBI appears in Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al.
(1992) and Alesina and Summers (1993). Recent surveys of this and later work are Eijfﬁnger and De Haan
(1996) and Cukierman (1998).
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deviations between actual practice and the law.3 Second, although CBI may be
negatively associated with inﬂation in relatively stable Western democracies it
may not be sufﬁcient to contain the inﬂationary impact of large price shocks such as
those that are induced by price decontrols and armed conﬂicts. A recent study by de
Melo et al. (1996) reports that inﬂation is lower in transition economies with a higher
level of sustained liberalization. A third purpose of the paper is to examine the
relative contributions, if any, of liberalization and of legal CBI to the abatement of
inﬂation.
To this point there has been little systematic work on measuring legal CBI and its
relation to inﬂation in the FSE. Two exceptions are the recent work of Loungani
and Sheets (1997) who construct an index of legal independence for 12 FSE and
relate it to the rate of inﬂation in those countries in 1993 and Neyapti (2002) who
develops similar data for a sample of eight Central and East European countries
between 1989 and 1996.4 This paper extends both samples along several dimensions.
First, it includes 26 FSE and considers the association between inﬂation and CBI
over the entire period between 1989 and 1998.5 Second, it provides indices for the
detailed features of the new laws that are based on the codiﬁcation system in
Cukierman et al. (1992) and in Cukierman (1992, Chapter 19). This makes it possible
to compare the level of independence of the newly created CBs with that of more
established CBs in the world and to experiment with several alternative measures of
independence.
The indices of independence developed in the paper reveal that the legal
independence of newly created CB in the FSE is higher than that of CBs in developed
economies during the 1980s. In particular, at least eight of the newly created CBs
possess levels of aggregate legal independence that exceed that of the highly
independent Bundesbank during the 1980s. The evidence in the paper also shows
that inﬂation and legal independence are negatively related but only after the process
of liberalization has been sufﬁciently strong and sustained.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methods used to
construct detailed and aggregate indices of legal independence. It also presents the
indices and puts them within an international context. Controlling for wars and
the extent of sustained liberalization, Section 3 presents preliminary evidence on the
relation between inﬂation and several aggregate indices of legal independence. The
sample consists of a pooled cross section time series comprising three broad time
periods; The period prior to the enactment of the ﬁrst CB law, the period after the
3Such deviations led Cukierman et al. (1992), Cukierman (1992, Chapters 19 and 20), Cukierman and
Webb (1995), Haan de and Van’t Hag (1995) and Haan de and Kooi (1998) to use behavioral proxies of
CBI such as the turnover of CB governors and their political vulnerability.
4See also Neyapti (1997). Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) contains an informative discussion of legal and
of actual independence in 5 CEE. Related work on various small subsets of FSE appears in Hochreiter
(1994), Hochreiter and Riesinger (1995) and in Hochreiter et al. (1996).
5Except for Bosnia–Herzegovina and (contemporary) Yugoslavia this is practically the entire universe
of FSE.
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enactment of the last CB law and, for nine countries, a period between the enactment
of a ﬁrst and a second CB law. The main ﬁnding is that legal independence and
inﬂation are unrelated.
Section 4 takes a deeper look at this lack of association by also controlling for the
temporary, but powerful, inﬂationary shocks induced by price decontrols and by
allowing for the potential existence of an interaction between legal independence
and sustained liberalization. The main ﬁnding is that the familiar, from developed
economies, negative relation between inﬂation and legal independence appears
also in the transition economies, but only after the process of sustained liberalization
crosses a certain threshold. Section 5 examines the relationship between inﬂation
and legal independence in a wider sample that includes the transition countries and
the developed economies. Section 6 tests empirically several hypotheses about
possible determinants of legal CB independence. This is followed by concluding
remarks.
2. The measurement of legal CBI in economies in transition
There are, by now, several alternative indices of legal CBI. The most
comprehensive of those is the index in Cukierman et al. (1992) or in Cukierman
(1992, Chapter 19). This index is based on a coding of 16 different characteristics of
CB charters that pertain to the allocation of authority over monetary policy,
procedures for resolution of conﬂicts between the CB and government, the relative
importance of price stability in CB objectives as stated in the law, the seriousness of
limitations on lending by the CB to government, and procedures for the appointment
and dismissal of the governor of the CB. Cukierman et al. (1992) present a weighted
index of those 16 characteristics (LVAW) and Cukierman (1992) presents an
unweighted version of the same characteristics (LVAU).
Other indices, as those used by Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989),
Grilli et al. (1991) and Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1993) can, for the most part, be
approximated by subsets of the components of the LVAW (or of the LVAU) index.6
We therefore code the legal independence of new CB laws in FSE in terms of the 16
components underlying the LVAW and the LVAU indices. This has two advantages.
First, given those 16 characteristics, it is possible to perform sensitivity analysis with
respect to the other indices by using appropriate subsets of those characteristics.
Second, the LVAW index exists for a wide number of countries during the 40 years
preceding the breakdown of Communism. The coding of CBI in transition
economies in terms of this index allows, therefore, a wide range of international
comparisons of legal independence.
The 16 basic variables underlying the aggregate index LVAW and the references
describing the conventions for their coding appear in Table 5 of the appendix.7
6A systematic comparison between the different indices appears in Eijfﬁnger and van Keulen (1995).
7The index LVAW is obtained via a two rounds judgmental aggregation procedure in the ﬁrst of which
16 various features of legal independence are aggregated into eight subgroups. Those eight subgroups are
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Each variable is coded on a scale between 0 and 1 where 0 stands for the minimal
level of independence and 1 for the maximal level. Our sample consists of 26
countries that include all the countries that broke off from the former Soviet
Union (FSU), Mongolia, and all the former socialist CEE countries except
Bosnia and contemporary Yugoslavia. Table 1 shows (in the last three columns)
alternative aggregate indices of legal CBI for those countries. In addition the
second and third columns show the year(s) of enactment of the CB law(s) and,
when relevant, the year of replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency,
respectively. In nine countries there were two CB reforms. In such cases the
country holds two rows, each with a different enactment year where the ﬁrst row
stands for the ﬁrst CB law enacted in that country and the second row for the second
CB law.
In some FSU countries like Lithuania and Moldova the Ruble continued to
circulate for some time after the enactment of the ﬁrst CB law so that this law
was not effective prior to the replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.
Hence, in order to evaluate the impact of CB independence on inﬂation it is
important to keep track of both the year of enactment of the law as well as of the
year of replacement of the Ruble. This is the reason for the appearance of the second
and third columns.
The table shows the aggregate index LVAW as well as two narrower indices
labeled LVES and LVESX, respectively. The ﬁrst index assigns positive weights only
to the allocation of authority for monetary policy, the procedures for resolution of
conﬂicts between government and the CB, and the degree of relative focus on price
stability as prescribed by the law.8 LVESX is a weighted average of the narrow
LVES index and of the subaggregate of all limitations on lending by the CB to
government from Cukierman et al. (1992) with weights of 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.9
It is calculated directly from the individual components in Table 5 of the appendix.
Among the CB laws exhibiting the highest levels of independence are those of
Estonia, the Czech Republic, Belarus, and the latest laws of Lithuania, Armenia,
Moldova and Poland. The last four laws have been enacted between 1995 and 1997.
(footnote continued)
then further aggregated to obtain the index LVAW. The weights used in the second and last round of
aggregation are; appointment and dismissal procedures and term of ofﬁce of the governorF0.20; location
ofauthorityovermonetarypolicy,CBobjectivesandseverityof limitationsonadvancestogovernmentF0.15
each; limitations on securitized lending, location of decision about CB lending and other miscellaneous
feature of limitations on lendingF0.10 each; and the width of the circle of potential borrowers from the
CBF0.05. The indices LVAU and LVAW are highly correlated. Further detail appears in Section 19.3 of
Cukierman (1992).
8The weights used are 0.4, 0.4 and 0.2, respectively. This relatively narrow index follows the spirit of
Eijfﬁnger and Schaling (1993) and of Eijfﬁnger and van Keulen (1995) who claim that those characteristics
of legal independence are far more important for inﬂation than all the rest.
9This aggregate ‘‘legal limitations on lending’’ variable is a weighted average of eight different variables
that pertain to the tightness of legal limitations on lending by the CB to government. The relative
magnitudes of the weights are the same as those in Table 19.2 of Cukierman (1992, p. 380). The correlation
coefﬁcients between LVAW and each of the following: LVES, LVESX are 0.92 and 0.90, respectively. The
correlation between LVES and LVESX is 0.96.
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Table 1
Aggregate legal independence in transition economies after CB reform and year of removal of the ruble
Country
Enactment
year
Year of removal
of the Rublea LVAW LVES LVESX
Albania 92 0.51 0.47 0.49
Armenia 93 93 0.30 0.60 0.34
Armenia 96 0.85 1.00 0.90
Azerbaijan 92 94 0.22 NA 0.42
Azerbaijan 96 0.24 NA 0.37
Belarus 92 94 0.73 0.75 0.67
Bulgaria 91 0.55 NA 0.65
Croatia 92 0.44 0.60 0.49
Czech Republic 91 0.73 0.96 0.73
Estonia 93 92 0.78 0.96 0.58
Georgia 95 93 0.73 0.68 0.62
Hungary 91 0.67 0.79 0.61
Kazakhstan 93 93 0.32 0.63 0.56
Kazakhstan 95 0.44 0.92 0.79
Kyrgyz Republic 92 93 0.52 0.55 0.55
Latvia 92 93 0.49 0.96 0.73
Lithuania 91 93 0.28 0.37 0.25
Lithuania 96 0.78 0.96 0.58
Macedonia 95 0.41 0.68 0.55
Moldova 91 93 0.38 0.84 0.54
Moldova 95 0.73 0.96 0.94
Mongolia 91 0.43 0.96 0.61
Mongolia 96 0.55 0.92 0.68
Poland 91 0.46 0.49 0.32
Polandb 97 0.89 0.92 0.95
Romania 91 0.34 0.51 0.32
Russiac 93e 0.43 0.47 0.41
Russia 95 0.49 0.47 0.38
Slovak Republic 92 0.62 0.92 0.73
Slovenia 91 0.63 0.72 0.52
Tajikistan 93 95 0.36 NA 0.29
Turkmenistan 92 93 0.26 0.25 0.19
Ukrained 91e 93 0.42 NA NA
Uzbekistan 92e 94 0.41 NA 0.71
Uzbekistan 95 0.56 0.92 0.92
Average 0.51 0.73 0.57
Countries with two CB reformsFaverages
First law 0.36 0.62 0.46
Second law 0.62 0.88 0.72
aFor obvious reasons this year is shown only for countries that used to be part of the former Soviet
Union. The source of the information for this column is: Transition Report, EBRD, various issues.
bAll the limitation on lending variables underlying the 1997 aggregate index for the Bank of Poland are
set to 1.00 because the 1997 Polish constitution prohibits government from borrowing at the CB. Further
details and discussion appear in the second footnote to Table 5 in the appendix, in Wojtyna (1997) and in
Huterski et al. (1999).
cThe ﬁrst Russian central bank law was passed on December 1990 but apparently was applied only at
the end of 1992 and was amended in 1993. In view of this, and since a new currency was introduced in July
1993 we picked 1993 as the year in which the ﬁrst Russian central bank law became effective. See also note
number 4 in Table 5 of the Appendix.
dThe narrower indices of legal independence for Ukraine are not shown in line with our rule not to
display an aggregate index when the sum of weights of the constituent legal variables for which there is a
meaningful entry is less than 0.7. As can be seen from Appendix table 5 data on some of the legal variables
in Ukraine is available. Had we calculated narrow aggregate indices from this small set of legal variables
we would have obtained indices showing a non negligible level of legal independence.
eTentative date.
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Why did those countries choose such high levels of independence? This is a question
that concerns the sociology and politics of institution formation. Section 6 below
offers a tentative discussion as well as preliminary evidence.
Late comers to the circle of CB reformers generally tend to enact laws with
higher levels of independence. This feature is particularly striking in countries that
had more than one CB reform like Armenia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Lithuania, Poland and Mongolia. In all those cases the level of independence
of the second law is higher than that of the ﬁrst law, and frequently, by a lot. The
ﬁgures at the bottom of Table 1 illustrate the average magnitude of this
phenomenon. It is noteworthy that, in addition, the average level of independence
of the ﬁrst law in countries with two CB reforms is lower than the average
level of independence in the entire sample but that their second laws embody a
signiﬁcantly higher level of independence than that of the sample average.
Essentially, countries that had two CB reforms initially granted less than average
independence to their CBs’ but were then led to reconsider their positions.
Once the authorities of those countries decided to have a second reform they
went farther in terms of legal independence than countries that had only one CB
reform.
The general trend in CB legislation illustrated by Table 1 is particularly dramatic
in view of the fact that during the 40 years ending in 1989 there were very few
changes in CB legislation.10 It appears, therefore, that the international monetary
policy consensus during recent years has been shifting vigorously towards
consideration of CBI as a highly desirable institutional feature. This conclusion is
reenforced by the international comparison of legal independence presented in the
following subsection.
2.1. The legal independence of new CBs in transition economiesFan international
perspective
This subsection compares the legal independence embedded in the (latest) CB laws
in transition economies with that of developed economies during the decade of the
1980s. The most striking fact is that, on average, aggregate legal independence of
new CBs in transition economies is substantially higher than CBI in developed
economies during the 1980s. This conclusion is robust to the type of aggregate index
used. For example, the average value of LVAW is 0.51 in transition economies and is
merely 0.36 in developed economies. Similarly, the average value of LVES is
a whopping 0.73 in transition economies against 0.29 in developed economies.11
Table 2 presents a common ranking of both groups of countries for the LVAW and
10Cukierman (1992, Chapter 19) and Cukierman et al. (1992).
11Since 1989 a number of developed economies (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, New-Zealand
and the UK) have upgraded legal CBI (Cukierman, 1998). It is likely that even if those changes are taken
into consideration average legal independence of central banks in transition economies will remain higher
than that of developed economies.
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the LVES indices. For the ﬁrst index the eight countries with the highest scores are
all transition economies, followed by high-independence countries among developed
nations like Germany and Switzerland. For the second index the first 10 countries
Table 2
A comparison of the new legal independence in transition economies and in developed economies during
the 1980s
(A) Ranked by LVAWa
Country LVAW Country LVAW Country LVAW
Poland 0.89 Bulgaria 0.55 Iceland 0.34
Armenia 0.85 Kyrgyz Republic 0.52 Romania 0.34
Estonia 0.78 Albania 0.51 Luxembourg 0.33
Lithuania 0.78 Denmark 0.50 Sweden 0.29
Georgia 0.73 Latvia 0.49 Finland 0.28
Moldova 0.73 Russia 0.49 UK 0.27
Belarus 0.73 USA 0.48 Turkmenistan 0.26
Czech Republic 0.73 Canada 0.45 Azerbaijan 0.25
Germany 0.69 Croatia 0.44 Italy 0.25
Hungary 0.67 Ireland 0.44 France 0.24
Switzerland 0.64 Kazakhstan 0.44 New-Zealand 0.24
Slovenia 0.63 Netherlands 0.42 Spain 0.23
Slovak Republic 0.62 Ukraine 0.42 Japan 0.18
Austria 0.61 Macedonia 0.41 Belgium 0.17
Uzbekistan 0.56 Australia 0.36 Norway 0.17
Mongolia 0.55 Tajikistan 0.36
(B) Ranked by LVESa
Country LVES Country LVES Country LVES
Armenia 1.00 Macedonia 0.68 Turkmenistan 0.25
Estonia 0.96 Croatia 0.60 Norway 0.21
Latvia 0.96 Kyrgyz Republic 0.55 Finland 0.16
Lithuania 0.96 Denmark 0.52 Ireland 0.16
Moldova 0.96 Romania 0.51 USA 0.16
Czech Republic 0.96 France 0.51 Belgium 0.08
Poland 0.92 Russia 0.47 New-Zealand 0.08
Kazakhstan 0.92 Albania 0.47 Italy 0.04
Mongolia 0.92 Switzerland 0.40 Sweden 0.04
Slovak Republic 0.92 Netherlands 0.37 UK 0.04
Germany 0.87 Australia 0.29 Azerbaijan NA
Hungary 0.79 Iceland 0.29 Tajikistan NA
Austria 0.76 Japan 0.27 Ukraine NA
Belarus 0.75 Canada 0.25 Uzbekistan NA
Slovenia 0.72 Luxembourg 0.25 Bulgaria NA
Georgia 0.68 Spain 0.25
a In countries with two CB reforms the latest of the two laws is used.
NA means that there is not enough information to calculate the index. We followed the rule of not
reporting an aggregate index whenever information on more than 30 percent of the (weighted) constituent
components was missing.
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with the highest score are all transition economies. The immediately following entries
down the ranking are largely taken, again, by the CBs of countries in transition.
It is evident from the table that, sometimes amidst high inﬂation, political
authorities in transition economies made signiﬁcant efforts to create CBs with high
legal independence by international standards. This raises two, possibly related,
questions. First, does the difference in legal independence between the two groups of
countries reﬂect a similar difference in actual CBI? Second, why did the political
authorities of transition economies rush to delegate so much legal independence to
their CBs? Our feeling with respect to the ﬁrst question is that the difference in legal
independence between the two groups of countries exaggerates the relative actual
independence of transition economies, particularly during the early stages of
transition from planned to market economies. One reason is that the translation of
legal independence into actual independence depends on the general regard for the
law which is likely to be higher in developed economies with a long democratic and
free markets tradition than in the newly created transition democracies. But as the
process of sustained liberalization persists and gathers momentum it is likely that
this relative bias shrinks. We return to this issue in Section 4.3. As to the second
question an important consideration is the realization on the part of policymakers in
the FSE that CBI can substantially enlarge the, initially rather limited, access of their
countries to international capital markets. In the world of the 1990s CBI is a stamp
of economic respectability and for some countries even a prerequisite for access to
those markets. It is also likely that the success of the Bundesbank in maintaining
price stability and the increasing professional consensus that CBI is conducive to
price stability played a role.
3. Legal independence and post-enactment inﬂationFa ﬁrst look
Most existing studies on inﬂation and CBI in developed and developing countries
excluding the transition economies are basically cross-sectional. This purely cross
sectional focus is dictated by the absence of meaningful temporal variation in
existing measures of legal CBI. But in the case of transition economies there were,
during the early 1990s, dramatic changes in CBI within all the countries concerned.
In many cases new CBs were created from scratch and were granted, as we saw in
Section 2, substantial levels of legal independence.
Did the enactment of new CB laws have a noticeable effect on inﬂation, and was
the decrease in inﬂation bigger in countries that experienced a larger increase in the
legal independence of their CB? Those questions can be answered empirically by
utilizing the over time variation, as well as the cross country variation in legal
independence. For that purpose we divided the sample, for most countries, into two
broad periods; a pre-enactment period and a post-enactment period. For countries
that had two CB reforms, the sample was divided into three subperiods. The period
prior to (and including the year of) the ﬁrst enactment, the period after the ﬁrst
enactment up to and including the year of the second one, and the period after the
enactment of the last CB law.
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In some of the FSU countries like Lithuania, Moldova and Tajikistan the ﬁrst CB
law was enacted prior to the replacement of the Ruble by a domestic currency.12 As a
result, the new CB law did not become effective until the time of replacement of the
Ruble by a domestic currency. In such cases the last year of the ﬁrst period is taken
to be the latest of the year of enactment of the CB law and of the year of replacement
of the Ruble by a domestic currency. We thus obtain a pooled cross sectionFtime
series sample with, at most, 3 periods for each country.
Aggregate legal independence after the enactment of either the ﬁrst or the second
CB law is taken from Table 1. Prior to the ﬁrst enactment or the replacement of the
Ruble by a domestic currency (whichever comes later) it is characterized by the level
of independence of the Russian CB for all the countries that broke off from the
former Soviet Union as well as for Mongolia.13 Russia had two CB laws. The ﬁrst
apparently became effective in 1993 and the second in 1995. Prior to the ﬁrst law CBI
in Russia is taken to be zero. Data on pre-enactment CBI for Hungary, Poland,
Romania and countries that broke off from the former Yugoslavia is the same as the
legal independence in those countries during the eighties and is constructed from
data in Cukierman et al. (1992) or in chapter 19 of Cukierman (1992). For the
remaining CEE countries, for which there is no data, it is taken to be zero.14
Characterization of pre-enactment CBI as zero for countries that broke off from the
former Soviet Union prior to (the earlier of) the introduction of a national currency
or the ﬁrst Russian CB law, is natural in view of the fact that there was no separate
CB in the Soviet Union. Admittedly, there was a Monobank (the Gosbank) but its
function was to ﬁnance the transactions that were implied by the central plan rather
than to function as a CB in the Western sense.
Inﬂation is characterized by the rate of depreciation in the real value of money (D)
which is naturally bounded between zero and one. This measure has two advantages
over the rate of inﬂation. First, it diminishes the inﬂuence of outliers. This is an
important consideration in a sample of countries with wide variations in inﬂation, as
is the case here. Second, D is a more meaningful measure of the impact of inﬂation
on individuals than the rate of inﬂation. This consideration is not important at low
rates of inﬂation since at low rates the divergence between the two measures is
negligible. But at high rates, of the kind that have been experienced by a good
number of countries in our sample, the divergence becomes signiﬁcant.15 D in year t
is calculated from data on inﬂation using the relation D ¼ F=ð1þ F Þ where F is the
12An informative discussion of the process of replacement of the Ruble by domestic currencies appears
in Melliss and Cornelius (1994) and Conway (1995).
13 In two countries – Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan – this classiﬁcation method leads to the creation of four
periods. In order to maintain the sample within a format of, at most three periods, we aggregated the last
two periods for Azerbaijan, and the ﬁrst two periods for Uzbekistan by assigning the averages of the
subperiods to each of the combined periods.
14Those countries are Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Experimentation
with the alternative assumption that in all those countries pre-enactment legal independence was the same
as the highest level of legal independence for the CEE countries for which there is pre-enactment data did
not materially affect the nature of the results.
15For example when inﬂation is 100 percent the rate of depreciation in the real value of money is only 50
percent.
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average rate of inﬂation between year t  1 and year t: Data on average yearly
inﬂation are obtained from various issues of the EBRD Transition Report and
Update (data and detailed references appear in Table 6 of the appendix).
The rate of depreciation in the real value of money within each subperiod is taken
as a simple yearly average within the subperiod. It is likely that, even if it has any
impact on inﬂation, CB reform operates with a lag. Higher independence is likely to
affect policy choices with some lag and those choices impact the economy with an
additional lag. The construction of periods in our sample builds in a lag by including
the year of enactment of a CB reform in the period that precedes this reform. As a
consequence the average rate of depreciation in the real value of money in a country
during any given subperiod is automatically related to the level of CBI that became
effective at least one year in the past. This procedure also reduces the risk of
simultaneity bias due to possible reverse causality from inﬂation to legal CBI.16
Simple regressions of D on each of the three indices of legal independence without
any controls yield negative and highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcients (at the 0.001 level) with
values of adjusted R2 ranging from 0.11 to 0.13.17
However, there is reason to believe that other factors like the extent of
liberalization, wars and price decontrols also exerted an inﬂuence on inﬂation in
the FSE. In particular, recent work by de Melo et al. (1996) suggests that inﬂation is
negatively related to the extent and the persistence of liberalization of the economy
which they measure by an index of cumulative liberalization. The cumulative degree
of liberalization (CLI) in a given year is deﬁned as a simple sum of the degrees of
liberalization (LI) up to and including the current year. The yearly liberalization
index is, in turn, a weighted average (with weights of 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4) of the degrees
of liberalization in the following areas: internal markets (I), external markets (E) and
private sector entry (P).18 The rationale for using a cumulative, rather than a yearly,
index of liberalization is that at any given time economic performance is affected by
the degree of liberalization at that time, as well as by the length of time that
particular reforms have been in effect. When looking for a potential relationship
between inﬂation and legal CBI it is therefore natural to control for the CLI. We
measure the degree of cumulative liberalization within a subperiod as the value of
CLI at the median year within the subperiod.19
16Further discussion of this issue appears in Section 6.
17Similar regressions of D on the same indices of legal independence for the developed countries during
the 1980s also yield negative coefﬁcients. But those coefﬁcients are not quite signiﬁcant and the adjusted
R2 are relatively low (between 0.03 and 0.08). Thus, in the absence of controls the negative relation
between inﬂation and legal independence is more in evidence in the panel of FSE during the 1990s than in
the cross section of developed countries during the 1980s.
18 I measures the extent of liberalization of domestic prices and abolition of state trading monopolies, E
measures the degree of liberalization of the foreign trade regime including the extent of currency
convertibility and P measures the extent of enterprise privatization and of banking reform. As is the case
with the aggregate liberalization index each of those indices is bounded between zero and one. The yearly
values of CLI appear in Table 7 of the appendix.
19When the number of years in a subperiod is even CLI for the subperiod is characterized by the mean
value of CLI in the two years in the middle of that subperiod.
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Eight out of the 26 countries in the sample were involved in regional conﬂicts for
at least part of the time span of our sample. Those countries are Croatia, Slovenia,
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Macedonia. Both theory
and evidence suggest that deﬁcits and inﬂationary ﬁnance are higher during wars.20
To account for possible effects of war on inﬂation we construct a war dummy (WD)
that assumes a value of one in those countries-periods in which the country was at
war for more than half of the time during the period (1, 2 or 3) and zero otherwise.21
The three periods data matrix used in this section is summarized in Table 8 of the
appendix.
Preliminary regressions (not shown) of D on CLI, the WD and the three aggregate
indices of legal CBI from Table 1 conﬁrm the de Melo et al. (1996) result that
inﬂation is signiﬁcantly lower the higher and the more persistent is the degree of
liberalization as measured by the variable CLI and reveal a positive and signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of war on inﬂation. But the impact of all three indices of CBI on inﬂation is
insigniﬁcant. Should we conclude from those preliminary results that, in the presence
of controls, CB reform in the transition economies did not have any desirable effect
on inﬂation? It is argued in the next section that reaching such a conclusion solely on
the basis of this evidence is likely to be premature.
4. Accounting for the inﬂationary impact of domestic price liberalization and of
interactions between CB reform and liberalization
4.1. Effect of domestic price liberalization
The process of decontrol of domestic prices produced sizable temporary non-
monetary jumps in the rate of inﬂation of many transition economies as prices of
domestic goods were allowed to adjust towards market values. CB reform was
often introduced just prior to, or concurrently with, the liberalization of domestic
prices. It is likely that in such cases CBI cannot offset the temporary impact of price
decontrol on the measured rate of inﬂation. Even if substantial, CBI alone is
insufﬁcient to contain the, temporary but powerful, price level adjustments that are
essential to the process of liberalization of internal prices. It is therefore possible, in
principle, that in spite of the fact that legal CBI does have a negative impact on
inﬂation in the transition countries, this effect is not detected by the preliminary
regressions because of the price shocks created by the process of decontrol of
domestic prices.
To examine this possibility we add the index of liberalization of internal prices, I ;
from de Melo et al. (1996) to the preliminary regressions. Within each subperiod the
value of I is taken as its value in the median year(s) of the subperiod. To also control
20See for examples Barro (1979), Barro (1984, Chapter 15) and Roubini and Sachs (1989).
21A consequence of this classiﬁcation is that all the periods for Macedonia are classiﬁed as ‘‘no war’’
periods since the 1991 armed conﬂict in that country was very brief.
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for the possible effect of currency boards on inﬂation we add a currency board
dummy (DCB) which assumes a value of one in country/periods in which a currency
board was in effect for more than half of the period and zero otherwise.22 The results
appear in the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3. In comparison to the preliminary
regressions the addition of this variable leads to a non-negligible increase in the
overall explanatory power of the regressions (the adjusted R2’s increase, by over
20% to a range of 0.40–0.43). It is apparent from the table that I has a positive and
highly signiﬁcant effect on inﬂation but the coefﬁcients of all three alternative
measures of aggregate legal independence are still insigniﬁcant. As in the preliminary
regressions the index of cumulative liberalization is still negative and signiﬁcant and
the WD still positive and signiﬁcant.
The general picture that emerges from the ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 leads to
the conclusion that the process of decontrol of domestic prices has a signiﬁcant
positive impact on measured inﬂation and that, in the presence of controls , there is
no evidence to support conventional wisdom regarding the negative relation between
inﬂation and legal CBI.
Table 3
Inﬂation, CBI, liberalization, wars and decontrols of domestic prices and currency boards without and
with a zero constraint on the effect of CBI on inﬂation for CLIo3.0a
Dependent variable: D
Regressors: Without a zero constraint With a zero constraint
CLI 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.28) (0.11)
I 0.36 0.43 0.42 0.31 0.32 0.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
WD 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
LVAW 0.19 0.47
(0.27) (0.00)
LVES 0.00 0.45
(0.97) (0.00)
LVESX 0.00 0.41
(0.98) (0.00)
DCB 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05
(0.67) (0.90) (0.83) (0.66) (0.57) (0.67)
Intercept 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R2 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.50 0.57 0.50
Number of observations 56 56 60 56 56 60
aNumbers in parentheses under the coefﬁcients are levels of signiﬁcance.
22This dummy assumes a value of one in the last periods of Estonia and Lithuania and zero in all other
cases. Details on precise times of currency boards appear in Kurt Schuler’s home page.
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4.2. Interaction between CB reform and cumulative liberalization
A possible reason for the lack of evidence in favor of a negative relation between
inﬂation and legal independence is that such independence is instrumental in
reducing inﬂation only when other structural features of the economy have become
sufﬁciently and persistently similar to those of developed market economies. A fuller
discussion of why this might be the case appears in Section 4.3. To examine this
possibility we reestimate the ﬁrst three regressions in Table 3 with a slope dummy at
high values of the cumulative liberalization index.23 The slope dummy is meant to
allow the detection of an interaction between the effects of independence and of
liberalization on inﬂation if such interaction exists. The slope dummy measures the
additional effect of legal independence on inﬂation when the cumulative liberal-
ization index is higher than a given threshold. We experimented with three
thresholds values; CLI=2.0, 2.5, 3.0. The lowest threshold leaves a similar number
of observations on either side of the threshold, and the highest leaves about a third
above it.
The addition of the slope dummy on legal CBI induces a further increase in
goodness of ﬁt. The most striking result associated with this addition (not shown) is
that the slope dummy is negative and highly signiﬁcant pointing to the existence
of a substantial difference between the impacts of CBI on inﬂation at low and at
high levels of cumulative liberalization. The total impact of CBI on inﬂation for
values of CLI above the threshold as characterized by the sum of the coefﬁcient of
CBI and of the corresponding slope dummy is insigniﬁcant for the lowest threshold.
For the remaining thresholds the total impact is not signiﬁcant for the broad
index of CBI (LVAW) but it is signiﬁcantly negative for the two narrower indices.24
It will be recalled that the ﬁrst of the narrow indices (LVES) considers only the
allocation of authority over monetary policy, the procedures for the resolution of
conﬂicts and the importance of price stability as relevant for CBI. The second index
(LVESX) also takes the seriousness of limitations on lending to government into
consideration.
In light of these results we reestimated the ﬁrst three regressions in Table 3 with a
zero constraint on the slope of legal independence for observations with values of the
cumulative liberalization index that are lower than the two higher thresholds
(CLI=2.5, 3.0). This procedure isolates the impact of CBI on inﬂation at high levels
of sustained liberalization. Results for the 3.0 threshold appear in the last three
columns of Table 3. Allowing the effect of legal independence to operate only at high
levels of cumulative liberalization induces a further non negligible increase in
goodness of ﬁt as can be seen by comparing the adjusted R2s of the ﬁrst and the last
three columns in the table. All the legal variables are now negative and highly
23Technically a dummy variable that assumes the value of one when CLI is above some threshold and
the value of zero otherwise is deﬁned. It is then used to create an additional variable that is deﬁned as the
product of the (appropriate) aggregate legal independence index and the previously deﬁned dummy.
24Due to some doubts about the extent to which the First Russian CB law was effective we also tried a
version of this experiments which classiﬁes the data as if Russia had only one CB lawFin 1995. The
qualitative results were similar.
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signiﬁcant. The impact of cumulative liberalization remains negative but is no longer
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The impact of price decontrols and of wars remain
positive and signiﬁcant and that of currency boards remains insigniﬁcant. Results for
the 2.5 threshold are qualitatively similar.
4.3. Summary and discussion
The main conclusion from Table 3 is that, in the presence of controls, the negative
relation between legal independence and inﬂation found in Western Democracies
also appears in the FSE but only above a certain threshold of sustained
liberalization. At levels of sustained liberalization below the threshold, legal CBI
has no impact on inﬂation while cumulative liberalization does have a strong negative
impact. By contrast, at levels of cumulative liberalization above the threshold, CBI
has a negative, usually signiﬁcant, impact on inﬂation and the (still negative) impact
of CLI on inﬂation becomes weaker.
At ﬁrst blush this ﬁnding may appear surprising. Why should CBI be more
effective in containing inﬂation at higher than at lower levels of cumulative
liberalization? A possible reason is that at high levels of sustained liberalization
general compliance with the law, including in particular the CB law is higher. As a
consequence, for any given level of legal independence, the effective level of
independence is higher the higher the level of sustained liberalization.
This begs the question of why compliance with the law should be higher in
countries with higher levels of sustained liberalization. A possible reason is that
the importance of law abidance for the orderly functioning of the economy and of
the political system increases with the degree of sustained liberalization. This
notion can be illustrated by considering the polar cases of a pure market
economy and of a command economy. Law abidance is important for stopping a
market economy from deteriorating into chaos by setting and enforcing clear
rules of the game in order to limit opportunistic behavior by a large mass of
independent agents. By contrast in a command economy, since the freedom of
action of most agents is severely limited in the ﬁrst place, law abidance is not as
essential.
4.4. Comparison to Loungani and Sheets
Recently Loungani and Sheets (1997) examined the relation between the logarithm
of inﬂation in 1993 and an index of independence they developed for a sample of 12
FSE. Loungani and Sheets ﬁnd a negative relation between those two variables.25
Our sample is wider than theirs in terms of both countries and time periods covered.
Since we use a number of CBI indices that differ from theirs it is of some interest to
examine the sensitivity of the results they obtain using their sample of countries
25The countries in their sample are: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. They construct an index of legal
independence from more basic data collected by Hinton-Braaten (1994) and Lewarne (1995).
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with our indices and broader time periods. This was done by reestimating the
inﬂation equations with and without the interaction with CLI for 9 out of their 12
countries.26 Although in all cases the coefﬁcient of aggregate legal independence is
negative, it is never signiﬁcant. Nor is there a signiﬁcant impact of the inter-
action term. When the same experiment is repeated only for the periods after the
enactment of the second CB law for the same nine countries the (negative)
interaction between legal independence and cumulative liberalization becomes
signiﬁcant in some cases.
5. Inﬂation and legal CB independence in an international sample
This section makes a step towards a broader examination of the relation between
inﬂation and legal independence by examining this relationship in a sample that
combines the (up to) three periods sample of transition economies used in the
previous section with data on inﬂation and CBI within the developed economies
during the 1980s.27 This data merging yields a sample of up to 79 observations. Two
sets of regressions are run. In the ﬁrst set inﬂation is related only to the aggregate
indices, LVAW and LVES, of legal independence without controlling for other
variables. The second set controls for the effects, in transition economies, of factors
like price decontrols, wars and the degree of sustained liberalization. Results are
summarized in Table 4.
It is apparent from the ﬁrst two columns of the table that, in the combined sample,
legal independence (whether measured by the broad index LVAW, or the narrow
index LVES) has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on inﬂation but that the overall
goodness of ﬁt is low. Results in the presence of additional factors appear in the last
two columns. All variables, including the indices of legal CBI, have the expected
signs and are highly signiﬁcant. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of the controls for
the transition countries leads to a substantial increase in the overall goodness of ﬁt
without affecting the signiﬁcance of the negative impact of CBI on inﬂation.
Experimentation with an interaction term between the index of cumulative
liberalization and aggregate independence (not shown) does not yield a signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient for the interaction term, but does yield again a negative and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient for the indices of legal independence.
In summary, the results with the international sample yield further support for the
view that, in spite of the fact that legal independence does not always fully translate
26This is due to data limitations.
27The data on the developed economies is taken from Cukierman et al. (1992). Although data on CBI in
developing countries during the 1980s is available we do not include those countries in the sample since
previous studies show that legal independence was a very poor proxy for actual independence in those
countries at that time (Cukierman et al., 1992 and Cukierman, 1992, Chapter 20). Those studies found no
relation between legal independence and inﬂation in developing countries which led them and others to use
behavioral proxies of independence like CB governors’ turnover or a measure of the political vulnerability
of the CB governor in the face of political change (Cukierman and Webb, 1995). The development of such
measures for the transition countries is beyond the scope of this study.
A. Cukierman et al. / Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002) 237–264252
into actual independence, it is nonetheless associated with signiﬁcantly lower
inﬂation.28
6. Determinants of legal independence
Although all FSE enacted CB laws with relatively high levels of independence
some countries went in this direction more than others. This section takes a brief
look at possible reasons for this cross country variation in the level of independence.
Eyeballing of the data reveals that many of the high-independence countries have a
geographical or cultural closeness to Western Europe and to Germany in particular
(Estonia, the Czech Republic and Lithuania), or have a very recent CB law (Georgia,
Lithuania, Armenia and Moldova). These observations lead to a number of tentative
hypotheses regarding the factors that are conducive to higher CBI. First, it is
Table 4
Inﬂation and legal CBIFan international samplea
Dependent variable: D
Regressors:
LVAW 0.34 0.37
(0.00) (0.00)
LVES 0.15 0.23
(0.07) (0.02)
CLI 0.11 0.13
(0.00) (0.00)
I 0.73 0.82
(0.00) (0.00)
WD 0.11 0.15
(0.05) (0.01)
Intercept 0.44 0.37 0.29 0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adj. R2 0.10 0.03 0.43 0.44
Number of observations 84 79 83 78
aThe international sample includes most of the developed economies during the eighties and our sample
of 26 transition economies in the pre- and post-CB law enactment periods, as well as an ‘‘in between laws
period’’ for transition countries that had two CB law reforms.
Numbers in parentheses under the coefﬁcients are levels of signiﬁcance.
28We saw in Section 3 that, in the absence of controls, the relation between inﬂation and legal
independence is substantially stronger in the panel of FSE than in the cross section of developed
economies during the 1980s. The fact that the ﬁrst two simple regressions that combine both samples also
yield signiﬁcant coefﬁcients is consistent with the view that those regressions are dominated by the
relatively larger sample of FSE. The signiﬁcant effect of legal independence in the last two regressions that
introduce controls for the FSE is consistent with the view that, in spite of the fact that they have on
average higher CBI and higher inﬂation than developed economies, after controlling for other variables,
transition economies with higher CBI also have lower inﬂation.
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possible that the cultural impact on countries that are nearer to Western Europe is
stronger. To examine this hypothesis we regressed the various indices of legal
independence on the distance between the capital city of each of the countries in the
sample and Berlin.
Another possibility is that the formal preconditions for joining the EMU might
have induced the countries on the fast tracks to join the monetary union to grant
more independence. The reason is that one of the preconditions for joining is,
according to the Maastricht Treaty, a sufﬁciently high level of CBI. Poland,
Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are on the ﬁrst fast track to join the
EMU and the Slovak Republic, Rumania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia are on a
second fast track to join it. To test for the possible effect, on the choice of legal
independence, of being on either one of the two fast tracks to join the EMU we
added two dummy variables to the regression. The ﬁrst dummy (second) assumes a
value of one if the country is on the ﬁrst (second) fast track to join the EMU and
zero otherwise. To test for the possibility that the level of independence granted is
higher the later is the time of reform we also added a regressor that measures the
difference between the year of enactment of the CB law and 1990. Finally, to
examine the possibility that countries with stronger inﬂationary experiences tend to,
subsequently, delegate more authority to the CB we added the average value of
inﬂation in the years prior to and including the year of enactment of the CB law to
the regressions. More precisely, two versions of the average lagged inﬂation variable
were tried. One that includes the year of enactment and one that excludes it.
The evidence from the ﬁrst set of regressions suggests that being on the ﬁrst (but
not on the second) fast track to join EMU usually has a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on the level of legal independence chosen. The number of years that elapsed
between the year of enactment of the law and 1990 also has a positive and (for some
of the aggregate legal indices) signiﬁcant effect on independence but all the
remaining variables, including inﬂation, are insigniﬁcant. In the second set of
regressions all variables, except for the lagged average value of inﬂation which
turned out negative and signiﬁcant, were insigniﬁcant. The negative sign of lagged
inﬂation is obviously inconsistent with the view that the authorities of countries with
higher inﬂation subsequently delegated more authority to their central banks.
7. Concluding remarks
The creation, from scratch, of new CBs in the FSE provides a natural experiment
for examining the extent of CB reform, its sociology and the relation between CBI
and inﬂation in an environment characterized by fundamental structural reform.
This paper develops extensive new data on the legal independence of CBs in the
post CB reform period in the FSE. The new data is constructed in a manner that
makes it comparable to earlier data on CBI in the industrial democracies and in,
non-FSE developing countries. The data indicates that CB reform in the FSE during
the 1990s has been quite ambitious. In spite of the large price shocks induced by the
transformation from plan to market, or perhaps because of them, reformers in those
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countries chose to create CBs with levels of legal independence that are substantially
higher, on average, than those of developed economies during the 1980s. But since it
is likely that the average level of compliance with the law in the FSE is lower than
compliance with it in Western democracies the discrepancy in actual independence
may not be as large as appears to be the case from this comparison.
Taken to the extreme, and in view of the large price shocks caused by
liberalization, the preceding observation could lead to the hypothesis that differences
in legal independence among the different FSE should not matter much for
inﬂation. The evidence in this paper suggests that such a conclusion is too extreme.
Controlling for other variables CBI is indeed unrelated to inﬂation during the
early phases of liberalization. But for sufﬁciently high and sustained levels of
liberalization, and controlling for wars and price liberalization, legal CBI and
inﬂation are usually signiﬁcantly and negatively related. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the view that legal CBI, no matter how high, cannot contain the powerful
inﬂationary impacts of price decontrols and of the liberalization of foreign trade
and of the exchange rate. But once the process of liberalization has gone far
enough legal independence turns out to be effective in slowing inﬂation down.
The evidence also suggests that the negative association between CBI and
inﬂation is stronger for narrow indices of independence that focus on the allocation
of authority over monetary policy, the procedures for the resolution of conﬂicts,
the focus on price stability and the seriousness of limitations on lending to
government.
The cumulative index of liberalization developed by de Melo et al. (1996) exerts a
signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on inﬂation, as is the case in their paper, mainly at low
levels of cumulative liberalization. Interestingly, at high levels of cumulative
liberalization, after a sufﬁciently sustained experience with the new liberalized
institutions has accumulated, CBI becomes relatively more important in keeping
inﬂation down and cumulative liberalization becomes less signiﬁcant. One possible
explanation for the increase in the effectiveness of CBI at high levels of cumulative
liberalization is that law abidance in transition economies rises with the level of
cumulative liberalization. As a consequence the discrepancy between the relatively
high legal independence of the CBs of economies in transition and their actual
independence shrinksFand legal independence becomes more effective in keeping
inﬂation at bay. A non negligible number of FSE have recently reached a range of
values of cummulative liberalization for which CBI does have a signiﬁcant
moderating effect on inﬂation (see Table 7 of the appendix). After controlling for
CBI, cumulative liberalization, wars and price decontrols, the evidence does not
support the view that countries with currency boards enjoy lower rates of
inﬂation.
Examination of the relation between inﬂation and legal independence in an
international sample composed of the transition and of the developed economies
strengthens the conclusion that legal independence and inﬂation are negatively
related internationally.
Nine out of the 26 FSE in our sample had two CB reforms. The average level of
independence of the ﬁrst law in those countries was usually lower than the average
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level of independence in countries with only one CB reform. This was often followed
by very high inﬂation in the countries with two reforms and then by enactment
of a second CB law. The average level of independence embodied in the second
law is substantially higher than that of the ﬁrst law in those countries. It is also
higher than the average level of independence in the 17 countries which had only one
CB reform.
A preliminary examination of the factors that determine the level of legal
independence chosen by political authorities suggests that being on the ﬁrst fast track
to join the EMU has a positive effect on legal independence, and that the later the
year of CB reform the higher the level of independence embodied in the new charter.
A possible reason is that the importance of CBI as a signal of ﬁnancial respectability,
to gain access to international credit markets, rose through the 1990s with the further
abolition of restrictions on capital ﬂows and further widening of international capital
markets. But the existing evidence does not support the view that countries with
higher inﬂation subsequently grant higher independence to the CB.
The fact that the average level of legal independence of the new CBs of economies
in transition is substantially higher than that of developed economies during the
1980s at least partially reﬂects the shift in professional consensus among economists
and policymakers in favor of CBI between those two decades. Our feeling is
that, had CB reform in the transition economies taken place during the 1980s
rather than during the 1990s, the level of CBI embodied in the new laws would
have been signiﬁcantly lower. This is one concrete illustration of the broader
principle that existing professional consensus at the time of reform affects the pattern
of reform.
Appendix
Table 5 presents codings of the components of aggregate indices of legal CB
independence. Table 6 presents yearly inﬂation rates and rates of depreciation in the
real value of money (D), 1989–1998. Table 7 presents the cumulative liberalization
index and Table 8 presents panel data for 3 subperiods.
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Table 5
Codings of the components of aggregate indices of legal central bank independence
Country Year of
enactment
of Central
Bank Law
CEO Policy formulation Objec-
tives
Limitations on lending
Term of
ofﬁce
Who
appoints
Dis-
missal
Other
ofﬁces
Who
for-
mulates
Final
authority
Role in
budget
Ad-
vances
Securitized
lending
Terms of
lending
Potential
borrowers
Type
of limit
Maturity
of loans
Interest
rates
Primary
market
Albania 1992 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 NA 0.60 0.33 0.67 0.33 NA 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.00
Armenia 1993 0.75 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00
Azerbaijan 1992 NA 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA NA 1.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.50 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.67 NA 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Belarus 1992 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.80 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00
Bulgaria 1991 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 NA NA 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.33 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 1.00
Croatia 1992 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.67 NA 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.00
Czech
Republic
1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 NA 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00
Estonia 1993 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00
Georgia 1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.00
Hungary 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.00
Kazakstan 1993 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 NA 0.67 0.75 0.00
1995 0.75 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 NA 0.00 0.75 1.00
Kyrgyz
Republic
1992 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.40 1.00 0.60 0.33 0.00 0.67 NA 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00
Latvia 1992 0.75 0.50 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 NA 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00
Lithuania 1991 NA 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.50 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 NA NA NA NA NA 0.00
Macedonia 1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.75 0.00
Moldova 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
1995 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 NA 1.00 0.75 1.00
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Table 5 (continued)
Country Year of
enactment
of Central
Bank Law
CEO Policy formulation Objec-
tives
Limitations on lending
Term of
ofﬁce
Who
appoints
Dis-
missal
Other
ofﬁces
Who
for-
mulates
Final
authority
Role in
budget
Ad-
vances
Securitized
lending
Terms of
lending
Potential
borrowers
Type
of limit
Maturity
of loans
Interest
rates
Primary
market
Mongolia 1991 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 NA NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
1996 0.75 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.25 0.00
Poland 1991 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.33 0.60 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
1997 0.75 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Romania 1991 0.00 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
Russia 1993 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.00
1995 0.25 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.20 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.75 0.00
Slovak
Republic
1992 0.75 0.50 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.60 NA 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.33 1.00 NA 0.00
Slovenia 1991 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 NA 0.80 0.67 0.00 1.00 NA 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00
Tajikistan 1993 NA 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.67 NA 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Turkmenistan 1992 NA 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 NA 0.00 0.25 0.00
Ukraine 1991 NA 0.50 NA NA 0.67 NA 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Uzbekistan 1992 0.25 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.67 NA 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.75 1.00
1995 0.25 0.50 0.83 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 1.00 0.75 1.00
Notes: 1. A detailed description of the 16 legal variables in the table appears in Table 1 of Cukierman et al. (1992, pp. 358, 359) or Table 19.1 of Cukierman (1992,
pp. 373–376).
2. Although the 1997 charter of the Bank of Poland does not contain any reference to limitations on lending to government we assigned the maximum value of
1.00 to all the limitations on lending variables for Poland in 1997. The reason is that article 220–2 in the chapter on Public Finances (Chapter X) of the April 2,
1997 constitution of the Republic of Poland states that; ‘‘The budget shall not provide for covering a budget deﬁcit by way of contracting credit obligations to the
State’s central bank’’.
3. The dates of enactment of the CB law in Ukraine and of the ﬁrst law in Uzbekistan are tentative.
4. The ﬁrst Russian CB law was passed in December 1990, apparently came into force only at the end of 1992, was followed by the introduction of a new
currency in mid-1993 and by the collapse of the Ruble zone at the end of 1993. In view of those gyrations we settled on 1993 as the year of enactment of the ﬁrst
Russian CB law. Unlike other CB charters the ﬁrst Russian CB law was not translated into English by the IMF. The coding of this charter relies on a translation
of relevant parts of this law from Russian by Daniel Treisman.
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Table 6
Yearly inﬂation rates and rates of depreciation in the real value of money (D), 1989–1998
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
InﬂationFperiod averages in percentages (100 F) D
Albania 0 0 36 226 85 23 7.8 12.7 32.1 20.6 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.69 0.46 0.19 0.07 0.11 0.24 0.17
Armenia 0 10.3 100 1346 3500 5273 176.7 18.7 14 6.7 0.00 0.09 0.50 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.06
Azerbaijan 0 7.8 107 912 1129 1664 411.7 19.7 8.4 0.8 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.80 0.16 0.08 0.01
Belarus 1.7 4.5 83.5 971 1187 2200 709.3 53 63.9 77 0.02 0.04 0.46 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.35 0.39 0.44
Bulgaria 6 22 333.5 82 73 96.3 62.1 123 1082 22 0.06 0.18 0.77 0.45 0.42 0.49 0.38 0.55 0.92 0.18
Croatia 2520.5 135.6 123 665.5 1517.5 97.6 2 3.5 3.6 5.7 0.96 0.58 0.55 0.87 0.94 0.49 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05
Czech Republic 2.3 10.8 56.6 11.1 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 0.02 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
Estonia 6.1 23 210.5 1076 89.8 48 29 23 11 10.6 0.06 0.19 0.68 0.91 0.47 0.32 0.22 0.19 0.10 0.10
Georgia 0 3.3 79 887 3125 15607 162.7 39.4 7.3 3.7 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.90 0.97 0.99 0.62 0.28 0.07 0.04
Hungary 17 28.9 35 23 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.13
Kazakstan 0 4.2 79 1381 1662 1892 176 39.1 17.4 7.3 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.64 0.28 0.15 0.07
Kyrgyz Republic 0 3 85 855 772 229 52.5 30.4 25.5 13 0.00 0.03 0.46 0.90 0.89 0.70 0.34 0.23 0.20 0.12
Latvia 4.7 10.5 172 951 108 36 25 17.6 8.4 4.7 0.04 0.10 0.63 0.90 0.52 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.04
Lithuania 2.1 8.4 224.7 1020.5 410.4 72.1 39.5 24.7 8.9 5.1 0.02 0.08 0.69 0.91 0.80 0.42 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.05
Macedonia 1246 120.5 229.7 1664.4 338.4 126.5 16.4 2.5 1.8 0.6 0.93 0.55 0.70 0.94 0.77 0.56 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.01
Moldova 0 4.2 98 1276.4 788.5 330 30 23.5 11.8 8 0.00 0.04 0.49 0.93 0.89 0.77 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.07
Mongolia 0 0 208.6 321 183 145 56.8 NA NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.76 0.65 0.59 0.36 NA NA NA
Poland 251 585.8 70.3 43 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 0.72 0.85 0.41 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.11
Romania 1.1 5.1 161 210.4 256 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.2 0.01 0.05 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.58 0.24 0.28 0.61 0.37
Russia 2.2 5.6 93 1526 875 311.4 197.7 47.7 14.7 27.8 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.94 0.90 0.76 0.66 0.32 0.13 0.22
Slovak Republic 0 10.8 61.2 10.1 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 0.00 0.10 0.38 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06
Slovenia 1306 550 117.7 207.3 32.9 21 13.5 9.9 8.4 8 0.93 0.85 0.54 0.67 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.07
Tajikistan 0 4 112 1157 2195 350 609 418 87.8 43.1 0.00 0.04 0.53 0.92 0.96 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.47 0.30
Turkmenistan 2.1 4.6 103 492.9 3102 1748 1005 992 83.7 17 0.02 0.04 0.51 0.83 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.46 0.15
Ukraine 2 4 91 1210 4735 891 377 80 16 11 0.02 0.04 0.48 0.92 0.98 0.90 0.79 0.44 0.14 0.10
Uzbekistan 0.7 3.1 82.2 645 534 1568 305 54 72 34 0.01 0.03 0.45 0.87 0.84 0.94 0.75 0.35 0.42 0.25
Sources: 1. EBRD, Transition Report Update 1999.
2. de Melo et al. (1996).
D is the rate of depreciation in the real value of money. It is calculated from the relation D ¼ F=ð1þ F Þ where F is the average yearly rate of inﬂation in
decimals.
The inﬂation data from 1992 onwards are from the 1999 EBRD Transition Report Update (the ﬁgures for 1998 are estimates as of July 1999).
The data for 1989 and 1990 are from de Melo et al. Except for Armenia, Belarus and Macedonia, whose data are from de Melo et al., the data for 1991 are
from the EBRD (1999).
Data for Mongolia for all years are from de Melo et al.
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Table 7
Cumulative liberalization index (CLI)a
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Albania 0 0 0.24 0.9 1.6 2.3 3.04 3.78 4.56
Armenia 0.04 0.08 0.21 0.6 1.02 1.44 1.93 2.65 3.37
Azerbaijan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.37 0.68 1.03 1.47 2.02 2.64
Belarus 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.71 1.07 1.55 2.03 2.54
Bulgaria 0.13 0.32 0.94 1.6 2.26 2.9 3.48 4.13 4.92
Croatia 0.41 1.03 1.65 2.37 3.16 3.98 4.83 5.68 6.53
Czech Republic 0 0.16 0.95 1.84 2.74 3.64 4.57 5.5 6.43
Estonia 0.07 0.27 0.59 1.23 2.04 2.93 3.86 4.79 5.72
Georgia 0.04 0.08 0.3 0.62 0.97 1.36 1.85 2.54 3.26
Hungary 0.34 0.91 1.65 2.43 3.25 4.11 5.01 5.91 6.84
Kazakstan 0.04 0.08 0.22 0.57 0.92 1.31 1.92 2.64 3.39
Kyrgyz Republic 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.45 1.05 1.81 2.63 3.49 4.35
Latvia 0.04 0.17 0.46 0.97 1.64 2.45 3.26 4.11 5
Lithuania 0.04 0.17 0.5 1.05 1.83 2.72 3.61 4.5 5.39
Macedonia 0.41 1.03 1.68 2.36 3.14 3.92 4.7 5.52 6.34
Moldova 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.56 1.07 1.62 2.3 3.05 3.8
Mongolia 0 0 0.44 0.99 1.6 2.27 2.94 3.61 4.44
Poland 0.24 0.92 1.64 2.46 3.28 4.14 5.03 5.92 6.81
Romania 0 0.22 0.58 1.03 1.61 2.29 3 3.72 4.47
Russia 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.67 1.26 1.92 2.69 3.49 4.32
Slovak Republic 0 0.16 0.95 1.81 2.64 3.47 4.33 5.19 6.05
Slovenia 0.41 1.03 1.74 2.52 3.34 4.16 5.01 5.88 6.77
Tajikistan 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.39 0.65 0.95 1.34 1.76 2.21
Turkmenistan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.25 0.41 0.63 0.85 1.17 1.53
Ukraine 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.41 0.54 0.8 1.31 1.9 2.55
Uzbekistan 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.38 0.68 1.11 1.69 2.26 2.83
aCLI is composed of the cumulative degrees of liberalization in internal and external markets and
private sector entry, with weights of 0.3, 0.3 and 0.4, respectively.
Sources: Till 1995: de Melo et al. (1996); 1996–1997: update provided by Cevdet Denizer, World Bank,
in July 1999.
Table 8
Panel data for 3 subperiods
Country Period D LVAW LVES LVESX CLl WD l
Albania 1 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.10
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.21 0.51 0.47 0.49 3.41 0.00 0.90
Armenia 1 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.20
2 0.59 0.30 0.60 0.34 1.93 1.00 0.70
3 0.09 0.85 1.00 0.90 3.37 0.00 0.80
Azberbaijan 1 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.00
2 0.94 0.43 0.47 0.41 1.03 1.00 0.70
3 0.26 0.24 NA 0.37 2.33 0.00 0.75
Belarus 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.10
2 0.96 0.43 0.47 0.41 1.07 0.00 0.40
3 0.51 0.73 0.75 0.67 2.29 0.00 0.75
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Table 8 (continued)
Country Period D LVAW LVES LVESX CLl WD l
Bulgaria 1 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.48 0.55 NA 0.65 3.48 0.00 0.60
Croatia 1 0.74 0.15 0.16 0.13 1.34 1.00 0.70
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.26 0.44 0.60 0.49 5.26 1.00 0.90
Czech Republic 1 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.10 0.73 0.96 0.73 4.57 0.00 0.90
Estonia 1 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.50
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.19 0.78 0.96 0.58 4.79 0.00 0.90
Georgia 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.30
2 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.61 NA 0.65
3 0.13 0.73 0.68 0.62 3.26 0.00 0.80
Hungary 1 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.39 0.91 0.00 0.80
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.17 0.67 0.79 0.61 5.01 0.00 0.90
Kazakstan 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.10
2 0.79 0.32 0.63 0.56 1.62 0.00 0.65
3 0.17 0.44 0.92 0.79 3.39 0.00 0.80
Kyrgyz Republic 1 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.32 0.52 0.55 0.55 3.49 0.00 0.80
Latvia 1 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.50
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.15 0.49 0.96 0.73 4.11 0.00 0.90
Lithuania 1 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
2 0.30 0.28 0.37 0.25 3.61 0.00 0.90
3 0.07 0.78 0.96 0.58 5.39 0.00 0.90
Macedonia 1 0.65 0.15 0.16 0.13 2.36 0.00 0.80
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.02 0.41 0.68 0.55 6.34 0.00 0.90
Moldova 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.10
2 0.50 0.38 0.84 0.54 1.96 1.00 0.75
3 0.12 0.73 0.96 0.94 3.80 0.00 0.80
Mongolia 1 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.59 0.43 0.96 0.61 2.27 0.00 0.70
3 NA 0.55 0.92 0.68 4.44 0.00 0.80
Poland 1 0.66 0.10 0.27 0.19 0.92 0.00 0.70
2 0.22 0.46 0.49 0.32 4.59 0.00 0.90
3 0.11 0.89 0.92 0.95 NA 0.00 NA
Romania 1 0.23 0.23 0.76 0.76 0.22 0.00 0.50
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.50 0.34 0.51 0.32 3.00 0.00 0.80
Russia 1 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.10
2 0.71 0.43 0.47 0.41 2.31 0.00 0.70
3 0.22 0.49 0.47 0.38 4.32 0.00 0.80
Slovak Republic 1 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.45
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 0.10 0.62 0.92 0.73 4.76 0.00 0.90
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